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Plaintiffs will not be heard to argue that they “could have shored up their cases by other means had they known their expert testimony would be found inadmissible.” His inability to produce admissible expert testimony is due to his own actions, namely the failure of his proposed experts to test their alternatives. 49, 55 (2005).
2019), analogously held that the standard for admission of expert testimony was “procedural” and therefore Pennsylvania’s Frye rule applied, not Texas’ stricter expert admissibility standard. 2d 439 (2005): [A]t the time this [product] was sold, it complied with all safety standards. 2d at 1013-14. Similarly, in Forrest v.
The court exercised its “gatekeeping” function under Rule 702 to assess whether the methodology underlying Plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony was “scientifically valid” and whether it could “be [properly] applied to the facts in issue.” Nor could Plaintiff fill that void by relying on expert testimony from other cases.
We think that they can, and for a state (like Pennsylvania and a number of others) that still follows the “ Frye ” standard looking to the “general acceptance” of expert testimony as the touchstone to admissibility, a Rule 702 state-law equivalent might look something like this: Rule 702. E.g. , Walsh v. BASF Corp. , 3d 446, 461 (Pa.
In two of these cases, our client won summary judgment at the trial court level and an appellate court ended up creating a new cause of action to accommodate the plaintiff’s theory (and lack of helpful testimony from the prescribing physician).
Thus a confident learned intermediary’s testimony will defeat causation as a matter of law by stating that, notwithstanding a poor result, the treatment provided was standard of care, and even in hindsight they would not do anything different. Confident learned intermediaries stand by their medical decisions. Medrano , 28 S.W.3d
The prescriber’s] testimony, however, does not establish that he would have altered his prescribing conduct. Given this testimony, the plaintiffs could not “show that stronger manufacturer warnings would have altered the physician’s prescribing conduct.” Plaintiff] has not identified any testimony from [the prescriber] that. . .
The defendant opposed admission of that testimony on the ground that “trade secret” – like “adulterated”/”misbranded” in our prior post – was a legal term of art, and thus improper as a basis for an expert opinion. The court agreed with the defendant, and wrote an unusually thorough explanation of why this testimony was being excluded. “One
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit an expert to render conclusions of law, because such testimony cannot properly assist the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. Rather, expert testimony couched as legal conclusion merely tells the jury which result to reach. See Tyree v. 3d 501, 543 (S.D.W.
at 287 (citing transcript of expert’s testimony). [A]t A]t first blush, [the expert’s] testimony. No other witness offered testimony on these unidentified standards. An excellent example is the Sherman case, which involved junk science causation testimony in what we call a “toxic soup” chemical exposure case.
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